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In a brief history of financial regulation, Long  But in developing countries, large banks tend
and Vittas note the removal or relaxation of  to be inefficient.  Their sizc is the result of
controls on credit and interest rates in the 1980s  controls and restrictions on competition and
and the growing emphasis on prudential controls.  entry rather than superior efficiency.  Allowing
universal banking might exacerbate the dominant
They argue that the 1980s were not a decade  position of large banks, with adverse effects on
of financial deregulation buL  a period when the  competition and efficiency.
rules of the game were substantially changed.
They discuss three criteria for evaluating finan-  Fairness covcrs many issues, such as
cial regulation and structure:  stability, effi-  protecting users of financial systems from
ciency, and fairness.  abusive behavior by the financial institutions,
creating a level playing field for competing
For forty years, financial stab!!t)  was not a  institutions, and tackling the problems caused by
significant concem, but today it is, as a result of  potential conricts  of interest.  Faimess can be
massive losses suffered by financial institutions.  more easily acilieved in systems with simple
Financial stability can be enhanced by increasing  structures, but limits on the permissible range of
capital requirements and strengthening financial  activities of different types of institutions might
supervision. But the stability of the financial  undermine efliciency and, to a lesser extent,
system is also affected by its structure. Systems  stability.
with "narrow" banks or "nonpar" banks would
be exposed to fewer systemic risks.  Clearly there are tradeoffs between these
three criteria for evaluating financial regulation
The relationship between structure and  and structure.  Long and Vittas suggest no
efficiency is also complex.  In the research  general answers to the questions inherent in
literature, the issues of cconomics of scalc and  these tradeoff:s. They contend that answers must
scope in finance remain unresolved.  In devel-  be sought on a country-by-country basis, al-
oped countries, there is growing concentration  though clearly extreme solutions that promote
and a spread of universal banking, suggesting  one criterion and disregard the others would not
economies of both scale and scope. Moreover,  be optimal.
available evidence suggests that concentrated
banking systems tend to have lower margins and
operating costs as well as higher profits.
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The financial systems of most countries experienced  dramatic changes  over the
past decade  or so in both financial regulation and structure.  At one level, there was
extensive deregulation as country after country eliminated or relaxed credit and interest
rate controls and removed or softened restrictions on market entry and diversification.
But, at a different level, the past decade  was characterized  by a growing emphasis  on
prudential and other regulations that were increasingly deemed  essential  for the smooth
and efficient functioning of financial systems. Thus, the decade  of the 1  980s was one of
regulatory reform rather than simply one of deregulation. The most notable feature of
financial regulation was the extensive and far-reaching change in the rules of the game
rather than the adoption of a laissez-faire  approach in finance.
Much of the change  in regulatory approach was an endogenous  respons. to forces
in financial markets.  Advances in electronic technology and telecommunications increased
the international links of financial systems and weakened  the effectiveness of many of th'e
pre-existing controls.  Moreover, three decades  of extensive regulation of credit flows and
interest rates gave rise to many instances of misuse of selective credit flows.  These
prompted a recmnsideration  of the underlying  philosophy that placed central emphasis  on
government  direction of funds.
The changes in regulation and technology were accompanied  by changes in
financial structure.  In most countries nonbe2k financial intermediaries  and financial
markets emerged  as significant competitors to the commercial  banks that had long
dominated the financial system.  In addition, changes  in philosophical  approach were
1fuelled by the impact of an increasing  volume of nonperforming loans on the financial
position of commercial banks.
This paper tracks the evolution of regulatory thinking in the post-war period.  It
discusses  the main criteria that could be used in evaluating financial regulation and
structure and highlights the questions that policymakers need to address in reforming their
regulatory  frameworks and reshaping  their financial systems.
Historical Perspective
In the 1  950s and 1960s, the financial systems of most developing countries.
especially the newly independent  countries of Africa and Asia, were dominated by foreign
owned banks, with limited branch networks located in the capital and port citiets. providing
primarily short term trade finance, much of which wert  to firms that were themselves
foreign-owned. In Latin America and Southern Europe,  the role of foreign banks was less
dominant, but the financial systems were similarly oriented towards short-term trade and
working-capital finance.  The governments of most countries decided the existing
institutions did not provide the type of financing needed  to develop their countries.
Among other objectives, governments  wished to promote industry and small scale
agriculture. They wanted finaocial systems that would mobilize deposits and make loans
in the rural areas,  provide long  n  n finance for investment, and fund locul than foreign
owned firms.
To accomplish their objectives, governments  introduced rather sweeping changes  in
financial practices.  In Africa most eovernments  tended to nationalize  the largest
commercial banks. In South Asia they nationalized  practically all the commercial banks. In
almost all developing countries governments  took control of a substantial segment of the
financial system.  In addition, they started specialized  industrial and agricultural banks
2under pubic  control.  With regard  to policies In the financial area, governments directed
financial institutions to lend to selected Industries on subsidized  terms.  Interest rates were
kept quite low,  isually below the rate of Inflation.  In other words, governments used
finance as a tool to reach their development objectives.  Given the financial systems then
in place, and the models of development prevailing  in the 1960s, the approach taken was
quite understandable.
By some measures, the pcUicies  followed were successfu!: banks did open many
rural branches, government deficits were funded, and credit was channelled  to priority
sectors and local businesses. But the policies did not create robust financial systems.
With rates of Interest on deposits below the rate of inflation, much of the domestic saving
did not go into financial assets.  Some of the funds went abroad  in capital flight, others
into physical assets.  Financial systems remained  small In terms of assets and undiversified
in terms of Institutions and financial instruments.  Because  of the shortage of domestic
credit, borrowers relied heavily on funding from abroad.  For a sample of countries in
1987, 22 out of 29 had foreign loans greater than the total of loans from the domestic
financial system.  Governments  and public enterprise  were the main recipients of domestic
credit receiving more than half the loans.  Many private firms were crowded out of the
market.
The problems created by the approach  taken to finance were not so apparent in the
1  970s when there was easy access to foreign funding.  But after the onset of the debt
crisis In 1982. it became much harder  to borrow abroad.  Governments  and state
enterprises  turned to borrowing from the domestic markets, further crowding out the
private sector and in many countries exacerbating  inflationary pressures. While many
developing  countries were able to maintain price stability, the average  rate of inflation In
3developing countries rose from 10% per year In the 1965-73  period, to 26%  per year in
1974-82, and to  51% per year In 1983-87.  The number of developing countries with
Inflation rates above 20% rose from 4 to  15 to 27 over the same  periods (World Bank,
1990).
The economic problems  experienced  by the developing countries in the 1980s are
well known.  In AfricM and Latin America,  but not in Asia, lack of access  to foreign funds,
higher interest rates, lower commodity prices, etc. have led to much slower growth.
Recessions  have reduced  the incomes of business  firms in both the public and private
sectors; devaluations have increased  the domestic burden of the firms' foreign debts; and
much higher real Interest rates in some countries have made domestic loans ha.rder  to
service. As a result, many firms have been unable (or unwilling) to service their debts and
the level of arrears has built up dramatically in financial institutions.
The external debt crisis has had an internal counterpart of equal severity.  The level
of arrears is such that financial institutions in many developing countries have been
decapitalized  -In  fact losses are several times book capital.  There have always been
occasional barkruptcles in financial institutions, but never before, not even In the 1930s,
has the problem affected as many institutions iri so many countries.  A growing number of
countries are dealing with the problems  in their financial sectors.  But other countries have
not dealt with the problem, or dealt with it only in the most pressing  cases.
Reforming Financial  Systems
To develop financial systems that can in the future finance their private sectors
efficiently, countries need  to tndertake a variety of reforms.  First, the financial institutions
need to be restored to vitality.  Second, countries must restore *nacro-economic  balance
and adjust relative prices, where distorted. Third, they must build their financial
4infrastructure by developing modern and effectivie  information, legal and regulatory
systems.
Financial  Institutions and markets should make choices among investments to be
funded on the basis ef expected return and risk.  Good information is needed in order to
make those choices, to monitor firms' behavior after funding, and to take appropriate
corrective action if things are not going as planned. For all three reasons. financial
Institutions require reliable company data, which In turn depends upon better accounting,
auditing and information disclosure rules.
Also, there must be adequate  legal protection for both debtors and creditors.  In
some countries, the company law, the banking and securities laws, and the bankruptcy
law are all outmoded or weakly enforced.  Financial agreements  are legal contracts and for
finance to flourish, there must be an adequate basis for drafting and enforcing contracts.
In most developing countries bank supervision has focussed on the implementation
of economic directives, such as credit allocation, to be certain bank lending was in
compliance with government directives.  Very little attention has been paid to the quality
of the loan portfolios, the adequacy of capital and the soundness  of bank management.
The huge losses now found in the banks' poitfolios in many developing countries are
testimony to the poor quality of this oversight function.
Both the financial needs of the countries and financial technology have changed
substantially over the last twenty-five years. In many of the developing countries the laws
and regulations, and correspondingly  financial practices, have not kept pace. Governments
need to pay more attention to prudential and less to economic regulation, leaving the
decisions of who is to get credit and at what price to the bankers. The regulators need to
focus on the safety and efficiency of the financial systems.
5The line between economic and prudential regulation is thin.  Any speciflc aspect of
regulation may-and most do--have  components of both.  But the focus Is different
between using regulation to control credit allocation and pricing t id using regulation to
maintain a healthy and efficient flnancial system.  It is not a matter of a complete
reorientation of focus, but rather a reweighting of the importance of economic and
prudential regulation. The rules of the game need to change. This does not suggest a
laissez-faire  approach-for all save a few academics  believe that the financial process must
be regulated--but a different orientation to regulation.
With regard to prudential regulation there is an emerging consensus  in some areas,
not in others.  The area of consensus  ircludes the points made above about limiting
allocative controls and strengthening prudential controls and supervision. There it  also
agreement  that there should not, In general, be discrimination, say in terms of tax policy,
among filnancial  instruments and institutions.  There is agreement  on capital requirements,
on criteria for entry and exit, on asset diversification, on limits on loans to insiders, on
provisioning for non-performing loans, etc.
With regard to the structural issues, there Is far less consensus. There is little
agreement  on how to define institutions for regulatory purposes  (e.g. what Is a bank?) or,
what amounts to more or less the same thing, on how to delimit the financial services
different classes of Institutions should be allowed to provide.  Indeed there is dispute
whether regulators or market factors should set such limits.  The dominant school of
th7ought  in Europe, though not In the United States, believes that financial Intermediaries
should be allowed to offer any combination of financial services they find most profitable.
The concept of the universal bank flows from this approach; a universal  license does not
mean that a bank will provide all financial se-vices, simply that it is allowed to choose
6what services it will provide.  But even the oxponents  of universal banking hav3 some
differences about how such banks should be structured and regulated, namely whether the
more risky servic',s should be provided in tho banks, by subsidiaries  of the banks or
through subsidiaries  of a holding company. The latter two models permit universal
financial Institutions, but limit the activities that can be done by each sub-unit.
Today in Eastern  Europe  the systems' change has forced the restructuring of the
entire financial system. The systems that are emerging  in some of the countries in the
first stage of reform do not seem  to be appropriate'. But even in the remainder of the
developing countries, the need to modernize  their financial systems - and to deal explicitly
with the pressing  problem of widespread bankruptcy of financial Institutions - is leading to
significant changes  in financial structure.  Though not the only factor at work, the future
structure of financial systems will be affected by regulation; to that degree at least,
governments  can influence the financial structures of their countries.
Alternative Models of Financial  Structure
in using regulatory reform for shaping the structure of the financial system,
policymakers can choose between several alternative models of financial structure.
Historically, the main distinction was between bank-based  and securities-based  systems.
Bank-based  systems are those systems where banks operating as universal institutions
dominate the provision of corporate finance, other than retained earnings. These banks
typically offer both short- and long-term loans and both commercial  and investment
banking services. In securities-based  systems, deposit banks confine themselves to short-
term lending and other commercial banking services. Much of corporate funding is from
'  Long and Sagari (1991) discuss some of the issues involved.
7the securities markets, which are more active than in bank-based  systems in issuing and
trading corporate securities 2.
Increasingly the distinction hetween bank- and securities-based  systems has lost
its relevance, at least in developed  countries.  In terms of both the sources of finance and
the services provided by various components of the system, differences have narrowed.
Furthermore,  in most OECD  cov-.ries,  internally generated funds have become the primary
source of corporate finance with banks and securities markets playing a secondary role in
the financing of Industrial corporations. Under these circumstances, the basic distinction
between alternative models of financial systems Nias  gradually shifted from one based  on
differences in sources of funding for industrial corporations to one based on differences in
the handling of information problems.
The principal differentiation is between relationship-based  and transaction-based
systems. In relationship-based  systems, banks and industrial companies cultivate close
links and long-term relationships  that govern not only the provision of finance but also the
provision of other financial services, such as assistance  with mergers  and acqLisitions.  In
transaction-based  systems, the relations are less close; industrial corporations tend to
assign their business  on a case by case basis to the lowest bidder.
2  Not all bank-based  systems involve banks operating as universal  institutions.  In most
developing  countries, banks have  traditionally specialized  in trade and short-term finance while
specialized  institutions have provided long-term  industrial and investment finance. Moreover,
in  many, perhaps in the  majority  of  developing countries,  guvernments have played a
significant role in the  finar  :al system both through  owning  intermediaries and through
directing the allocation of fil.dncial resources. However, whether financial systems can be
more aptly described as credit-based  or government-based,  a feature they share in common
with  bank-based systems is the  predominance of  bank loans as opposed to  corporate
securities.
8Different types of systems have different implications for  financial regulation.
Universal  institutions are more difficult both to manage  and to supervise. They also raise
more problems of conflicts of interest and moral hazard. But as managerial  and
supervisory  capabilities improve, universal institutions providing a range of services appear
to have significant advantages in overcoming the problems of informational asymmetries
and investment uncertainty.
Policymakers  are not required to take irreversible decisions. Regulation  can be
adapted  in the light of changing circumstances. However, regulatory caution suggests
that policymakers should proceed  slowly and at least initially encourage  the creationi  of
simple structures that are more transparent and easier  to manage  and supervise.
Evaluatina Financial  Regulation  and Structure
Three criteria can be suggested  for evaluating financial reguiation and structure:
stability, efficiency, and fairness.
Stabilitv.  Financial systems the world over have been shocked by loan losses in the
1 980s.  For forty years the stability of financial systems had not been a significant
concern; it is today.  Much has been written about the new capitalizaticn rules as specified
by the Basle Committee. Clearly  financial institutions with more capital and less leverage
are less subject to shocks.  But the stability of the financial system is also affected by its
structure.
To protect the payment mechanism,  regulators could limit access  to the payment
clearing and settlement system to so-called "narrow" banks that would be allowed to
engage in only the safest activities.  Only those institutions would be allowed to issue
liabilities insured by government. Milton Friedman  proposed  in the early 1  950s to require
intermediaries  with access  to the payment system to hold 100% reserves. Recent
9suggestions on so-called "narrow"  banks are more liberal but would require banks issuing
demand  deposits to hold only safe assets'.
This approach would increase  the stability of the payment system but not
necessarily  that of the credit system, for other intermediaries  would hold the more risky
assets.  If a country were threatened by wide-scale bankruptcies and debt deflation, the
government might still be compelled to intervene.
Another financial structure that would be more stable with regard to credit would
be Islamic or 'non-par"  banking in which payments on all liabilities would be contingent on
asset performance. "Non-par" banks would resemble  mutual funds.  Their successful
operation would require well developed  financial markets and adequate supervision  and
disclosure of information.
These are only two examples, but tniey  illustrate that the stability of the financial
system will be affected by its structure as well as its capital.  A practical issue affecting
stability concerns the effectiveness of supervision. Structures involving universal banks
appear  to be harder to supervise  than more specialized  institutions.  This suggests that
countries in which supervision is poorly developed  might consider limiting the scope of
activities of their intermediaries  until supervision  can be improved.
Efficiency.  The relationship  between structure and efficiency is clearly complex.
As a practical matter we observe in manv countries growing concentration in financial
3  The concept of the "narrow"  bank is a recent innovation by academic economists.
However, narrow banks have long existed in several  European  countries in the form of postal
giros that offered transaction accounts and invested  in government  securities. It is interesting
to note that postal giros have gradually  been merged  with postal savings banks and later on
have been converted into, or merged with,  fully fledged commercial banks with  universal
functions. Thus, historically and  absent regulatory  impediments,  the model  of "narrow" banks
has yielded to tha  u.f  banks with wider powers. This raises doubts about the feasibility and
economic efficienicy of "narrow" banks.
10markets and expansion in the range of financial services offered by individual Institutions,
suggesting economies  of both scale and scope4. In the research  literature the issues of
economies of scale and scope in finance still seem  unresolved.  Evidence  from developed
countries suggests that banking systems with high levels of concentration tend io have
lower margins and operating costs as well as higher profits.  Banks  In Canada,  the
Netherlands  and Sweden, all of which are characterized by highly concentrated banking
systems, have outperformed banks In the United States, Norway and Italy, where banking
systems tend to be fragmented and concentration is low (Vittas, 1991).
In many of the developing countries the financial markets are dominated by a few
large, often inefficient  banks, which may control as much as 80 per cent of financial
assets. Their size may be based less on economies  of scale and more on restrictions on
new bank licenses, on interest rate and credit controls that discourage  competition, on
forced branching, etc.  In many of these countries the efficiency of the financial markets
would probably be increased  by greater competition, which could come from licensing new
banks and by allowing international trade in financial services.
With issues of structure we are as concerned with economies  of scope as scale.
Portugal, in reforming its system in anticipation of the single European  market after 1992,
opted for universal banks on the grounds that to restrict function would put its banks at a
competitive disadvantage  with banks from other European  countries that allow universal
banking. Of course, that presumes  there are economies of scope; there are no
disadvantages  In terms of efficiency to specialized  intermediaries  if scope economies  do
4  One suggested  economy  of scale  is the realization  that institutions can be too large for
the government to allow them to fail;  hence the liabilities of  large intermediaries may be
considered  more secure.  From the social perspective, this may be a diseconomy of having
large intermediaries.
11not exist.  Canada  recently allowed the banks to enter the securities business  and over a
short period of time the banks came  to dominate the business suggesting  the existence of
economies  of scope. The Canadians  are now considering whether to allow the banks to
offer insurance as well.
For developing countries, the question of the desirability of universal banking is hard
to resolve.  First, as already noted, universal Institutions are more difficult to supervise
effectively.  Second, allowing universal banking might exacerbate  the dominant position of
large banks. The experience of developed  countries shows that securities markets develop
faster in countries where banks' activities are limited to short term commercial  finance and
less rapidly in countries with universal banking. In countries allowing universal banking a
broad array of financial products appears  less likely to develop. Whether this indicates
that universal banks can efficiently provide the financial services needed by corporations or
whether large banks have been able to block the development of competing institutions is
unclear.  Product and market development needs to be considered  in assessing  efficiency
and structure.
There is also a question of competitive equality.  In the early 1980s the World
Bank was asked by the Philippine  government to prepare  a report on the advantages  of
universal versus specialized  banking. Two departments in the World Bank  gave the
government contrary advice:  one for, the other against, universal banking. Those in favor
argued that universal banking would increase  the availability of term finance; those against
maintained that, because  of Implicit and explicit government Insurance, universal banks
would be able to provide cheap term finance, but only by passing some of the risk to
taxpayers through understated deposit insurance premiums. Thus, universal banking
12would forestall the development  of the securities markets and m,ight  even over the longer
run reduce the availability of term finance.
Fairneas, Fairnsss  covers many issues such as protecting users of financial
services from a.busive  behavior by financial institutions, creating a level playing field for
competing institutions and tackling the problems  caused by potential conflicts of interest.
The interests of small savers, investors, borrowers and policyholders, who are deemed  to
be nonprofessional  users of financial services, are safeguarded  by appropriate protective
regulations. The Interests of professional users, including participating financial
insdtutions, are best protected by appropriate regulations regarding  disclosure of
information and market practice.
Serious conflicts of Interest can arise when the ownership and management  of
financial and non-financial firms are not kept separate. It has been argued in the case of
both Germany  and Japan that the close ties between financial and non-financial firms has
contributed significantly to the development  of the productive sectors.  After providing
funds, lenders must supervise  and enforce their contracts with borrowers.  It has been
recognized  in the German  and Japanese  cases  that interlocking ownership and control
allows lenders  to monitor borrowers' activities more effectively, thus allowing banks to
take financing risks that would be unacceptable  if post-lending  control were not well
developed.
Because  of the poor quality of information and the difficulty in enforcing contracts,
the problems  of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse  selection are more
serious in developing countries.  Because  contracting with related firms is far less risky
than contracting with outsiders, there has been a tendency in developing countries for
conglomerates  to evolve.  But there are well known cases  in developing countries where
13Interlocking control -in  both the public and private sector-  of productive and financial
enterprises has led to less than arm's length decision making on loans, leading, in some
cases, to rather disastrous misallocation of resources. Such arrangements,  when in the
private sector, are likely to lead to excessive  concentration of wealth and power.
Interlocking control has also been used to prevent competition within the industrial sector
by excluding potential competitors through control of finance.
Those concerned about conflicts of interest argue for strict separation of control
and management  of banking and industrial firms.  But in fact historically ownership and
management  of financial and non-financial firms has been linked in most countries,
possibly because  it improves information flows and economizes  on managerial  skills.  Strict
separation of function may limit abuse, but it may also slow the process of development.
Hence this is an important and contentious issue.
Of course in the United States concern over conflicts of interest goes beyond the
Interlocking of industrial and financial firms.  Conflicts can also arise from interlocking
financial services. For instance, the proceeds  from an underwriting by a bank can be used
to repay outstanding loans to the bank. To limit such frauds, the  United States has
attempted to Impose "Chinese  walls" among different types of financial services. Of
course finance and fraud are inseparable,  but interconnected financial activities have been
said to make fraud that much easier. There seems  to be some reconsideration of that
viaw going on at the present time, with the regulators allowing  banks to provide some
underwriting services even in the United States. The regulators today seem to feel that
while they cannot eliminate such conflicts, through supervision they are now better able to
control them.  But considerations  of the potential conflicts of interest and the ability of a
14country's supervisors  to control them must enter into decisions on structure and
regulation.
Questions of Regulation  and Structure.
The analysis presented  Indicates the complexities of these structural issues and the
difficulty of reaching a consensus. There are clearly trade-offs between the three criteria
suggested above to evaluate regulation and structure.  These will lead to different
decisions among countries about preferred structures and therefore about the proper
regulatory environment. In taking decisions about regulation and structure, the following
questions need to be addressed  by policymakers. These questions do not have general
answers but must be answered in the context of particular countries:
a.  In terms of ownership and management,  what should be the "allowed'
relationship  between financial and non-financial corporations? Related  to
this is the question of the scope and extent of public ownership.
b.  Within the financial sector, are there principles for deciding what products
can safely and efficiently be offered by a single financial institution? In other
words should the regulatory system encourage  or discourage the formation
of universal, as distinct from more specialized,  financial intermediaries?
C.  In countries electing to have broad based intermediaries,  what are the
advantages and disadvantages  of different forms of arrangements:  universal
banks, "narrow"  banks that are part of financial holding companies,  or banks
which own but are legally separated  from subsidiaries  which offer other
financial products?
d.  Is regulation by function to be preferred to regulation by institution?
Regulation  by function appears  to be a way of avoiding tha problems of
15overregulation and unequal  treatment of institutions engaging  in similar
functions, but is it feasible? Closely related to the last issue, is It feasible to
define intermediaries  for regulatory purposes? That is, can the regulators
reasonably define In terms of assets and liabilities as well as in terms of
other financial services a "narrow" bank, a finance company, a leasing
company, a broker-dealer,  etc.?  A number of suggestions that have been
made about regulation depend on the regulators being able to impose
reasonably clear rules.
e.  How is financial structure affected by limiting deposit insurance to some
Institutions, imposing  reserve  requirements on some institutions but not
others, double taxation of dividend income, etc.?
f.  Non-bank intermediaries  and markets raise other regulatory issues.
Insurance companies like banks must be subjected to solvency regulation
and supervision. Also like banks, entry and exit constraints, pricing control
and excessive Intervention on investment decisions affect their development.
The question of consumer  protection is also important in the insurance
business  as in banking.
d.  For their part, securities markets require  trading and disclosure rules to
ensure both efficiency and fairness.  How detailed should these rules be?  Is
there a danger of overregulation impeding the development of markets?
h.  An issue that Is shared by payment clearing systems and settlement and
clearing systems for securities transactions is who should have access to
such systems and under what criteria and conditions.
16h.  Finally, one problem posed by diversified financial systems for countries at
an early stage of development  Is the heavy burden  of regulation and
supervision. Perhaps  such countries may be better off with simpler financial
systems based on competitive and sound commercial  banks.
In conclusion, in the last fifteen years, there have been very marked changes  in
financial regulation and structure In both developing and developed  countries.  These
reflect in part a change  in philosophy  and In part changes in technology and the
Internationalization  of markets.  The regulations  that are being changed were in many
cases  the outgrowth of the excesses  of the 1  920s, followed by the financial collapse In
the 1930s.  As was said in the 1989 World Development  Report (World Bank, 1990):
'The  lessons  to be learned  from the experience  of the high-income  countries
is that the financial decisions of private agents are also imperfect....  Market-
based financial systems, like public ones, are subject to fraud and instability.
The goal Is not perfection but a system which mobilizes  resources
efficiently, minimizes  allocative mistakes, curbs fraud, and stops instability
from turning into crises....  A main concern of financial regulation has been
the achievement of stability without  undermining efficiency.  But finance
remains a dynamic field, changing far too rapidly to achieve  a perfect
balance between the freedom needed  to stimulate competition and growth
and the control needed  to prevent fraud and instability."
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